Gain-of-function research on infectious diseases, long controversial within the scientific community, has become a political target since the outset of the COVID-19 pandemic.
Robert F. Kennedy Jr., if confirmed as the next health secretary, may seek to ban it — a move that could have sweeping consequences for scientific development in America by prohibiting experiments that help scientists understand how infectious diseases work but could make them more harmful to humans if they were to leak from a lab.
Richard Ebright, a professor of microbiology at Rutgers University, told NOTUS he spoke with Kennedy at length about a potential ban on gain-of-function research earlier this year.
“This is very much a priority for him,” Ebright said when asked if Kennedy would seek a ban on gain-of-function research or experiments that could increase the pathogenicity or transmissibility of a virus.
Ebright said that Kennedy would support the restrictions on gain-of-function research outlined in the Risky Research Review Act, a bill introduced by Sen. Rand Paul that outlines a system of federal oversight for gain-of-function research on some viruses.
“Kennedy supports that proposal, but Kennedy would go beyond that and simply call for a ban on the category of research,” Ebright said.
Kennedy and Donald Trump’s transition team did not respond to a request for comment. A page on the website of Children’s Health Defense, a nonprofit Kennedy founded, lists a “private interview” between Kennedy and Ebright in early 2024.
This issue, however, is not new for Kennedy. Children’s Health Defense lists prohibiting gain-of-function research in its “10-Point Plan to Reform Pharma.”
“Haven’t we had enough of this dangerous research to produce more deadly viruses,” Kennedy asked on X in June, pointing to gain-of-function research on mpox. “My administration will get to the bottom of it — and end it for good.”
But some health security experts say that a ban on gain-of-function research could have a chilling effect on infectious disease studies in the U.S. because it’s difficult to define a clear scope for the term since the nature of scientific research means it can be impossible to determine the exact effects of an experiment on a pathogen. This could lead to scientists avoiding potentially meaningful research out of fear, said Gigi Kwik Gronvall, a professor at the Center for Health Security at Johns Hopkins University.
“People don’t want to get anywhere close to breaking the law,” Gronvall said. “The end result we’re going to have, and I think we’re already seeing, is risk-averse behavior.”
Gronvall said that could result in the U.S. falling behind in biothreat research — especially when it comes to threats currently centered in the U.S., like H5N1, also known as bird flu.
“It’s not somebody else’s problem, so it’s not going to be their priority,” Gronvall said.
Health experts and politicians from both parties agree that better oversight of certain kinds of potentially risky pathogen research is necessary. But experts say the scope of that oversight should be defined by scientists who understand the specifics. Biden’s White House introduced stricter guidelines on research into “pathogens with enhanced pandemic potential” this spring, but the guidelines aren’t binding and apply only to research supported by the U.S. government. Paul’s bill would establish binding rules for researchers but defines “gain-of-function research” as any research “that has the potential to enhance the transmissibility or virulence of a potential pandemic pathogen.”
“I think that the current approach is too lax in the sense that it leaves too many holes,” said Nicholas Evans, an associate professor of philosophy at the University of Massachusetts Lowell who specializes in bioethics. Evans added that “given the history and scope of the U.S. legislature’s attempt to define and bracket out particular kinds of research to not fund or to prohibit, it would probably result in more harm than good at this stage.”
The off-target effects of a blanket ban on gain-of-function research could be wide-ranging and lead to an overall slowdown of the infectious disease research landscape, said Amalia Corby, director of federal affairs at the American Society for Microbiology, and could impact how quickly countermeasures such as vaccines can be developed.
“It has the potential to basically shut down basic pathogen research,” Corby said. “We may not be prepared for the next pandemic because we won’t have the research pipeline to actually respond to it.”
Such an outcome would be ironic since the current focus on limiting gain-of-function research stems in part from concerns that the COVID-19 pandemic resulted from an enhanced pathogen escaping from a lab in Wuhan, China. While it may be impossible to ever know the exact origins of the pandemic, most scientists agree the virus likely jumped from wild animals to humans, possibly at a market where illegal trade in wild animals was taking place.
Kennedy has supported the “lab leak” hypothesis, including in his book “The Wuhan Cover-Up.” Recent reporting from The Bulwark revealed that in 2020 Kennedy said that he was open to the idea that the government may have “planned” COVID-19.
Experts say that while restrictions on potentially dangerous research are important, implementing a wide-ranging ban based on the theory that COVID-19 originated in a lab would not just be counterproductive in the case of a future pandemic, but it would also serve as a distraction from the actual problems that led to the COVID-19 pandemic, and have yet to be solved.
“We still could make a big effort to have those markets operate more safely,” Gronvall said, referring to the Wuhan market that was possibly the site of the first COVID-19 spillover event, but “it would take a lot of political will.”
“Those are the drivers for the next pandemic, and we’re just pretending it doesn’t exist,” Gronvall said.
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Margaret Manto is a NOTUS reporter and an Allbritton Journalism Institute fellow.